孙云涛,宋依群.售电市场环境下售电公司与电力用户双层博弈模型研究[J].水电能源科学,2018,36(10):210-214
售电市场环境下售电公司与电力用户双层博弈模型研究
Study on Two Level Game Model between Retailers and Users in Electric Selling Market
  
DOI:
中文关键词:  售电市场  用户选择  演化博弈  售电策略  双层博弈
英文关键词:electric selling market  choices of users  evolutionary game  competitive strategies  two level game
基金项目:
作者单位
孙云涛,宋依群 上海交通大学 电子信息与电气工程学院, 上海 200240 
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中文摘要:
      售电市场放开是我国售电侧改革的发展方向,竞争性售电市场中用户选择权放开,用户选择结果影响售电公司的售电策略,售电公司售电策略又会直接影响用户选择。构建售电公司与电力用户间双层博弈模型,下层模型为用户层演化博弈,上层模型为售电公司间非合作博弈。首先分析影响用户选择售电公司的因素,建立用户效用模型,采用演化博弈理论构建不同类型用户群体选择售电公司的多群体动态演化模型。在构建用户选择模型的基础上,分析售电公司的购售电策略,计及售电公司面临的风险因素,建立售电公司和电力用户的双层博弈模型并给出了博弈均衡的求解算法。算例分析结果表明,所构建的模型和算法具有可行性和有效性。
英文摘要:
      The liberalization of electric selling market is the development direction of China's reform of the electricity market. Power consumers have options to choose among retailers in competitive electric selling market, and the selection results interact with the competitive strategies of the retailers. A two level game model between retailers and users is established, the lower level of which is an evolutionary game between users and the upper level is a non cooperative game between retailers. Factors that affect users' choices of retailers in the electric selling market are analyzed, and the user utility model is established. Then a dynamic evolutionary model which shows different types of users choosing retailers is established based on evolutionary game theory. On the basis of the lower level model, a two level game model between retailers and users is established considering the competitive strategies of the retailers and the risk factors the retailers are facing. Finally, the algorithm of the model is proposed. The results of typical case indicate the feasibility and effectiveness of the proposed two level game model.
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